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Abstract. How to rid railway stations of the marginalized people who congregate 
in them? This is the problem faced by railway companies which are seeking to 
maximize the attraction of their spaces. The limitations of a strictly repressive 
policy are leading railway companies to fund non-profit community based 
organizations to carry out social policies aimed at the marginalized. Based on 
two monographs in the railway stations of Lyon and Milan, the article analyzes 
how this strategy was implemented. The analysis requires a distinction to be 
drawn between two conceptions, one which sees social policies and security 
policies as polar opposites, and the other which identifies them with one another. 
The work of the non-profit community-based organizations shows that the 
boundary between social policy and security policy is a tenuous one, since the 
principal aim is to disperse the marginalized and move them away from the 
station. Control of the marginalized is based on the use of incentive structures 
rather than on coercion. The organizations also have to retain control of their 
philanthropic legitimacy, which they are selling to the railway companies, but 
which they are also putting at risk. Attention to the agency of the actors allows us 
to avoid an irenic analysis (in which “human” and “just” social policies come to 
the aid of the marginalized) and a malefic analysis (in which social policies are 
merely security policies in disguise).  
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0. Introduction: railway stations in cities and the problem of 
marginalized people 
Railway stations are miniature cities within cities: tens of thousands of 
travellers pass through them every day, creating a meeting point for a diverse 
range of populations. They are strategic places in the management of urban and 
regional flows. The railway stations of the 19th century were closely controlled by 
a state obsessed by a fear of crowds (Bowie 1996). Only travellers had the right to 
enter these spaces, and they had to wait for their train in fenced-off waiting rooms 
(Ribeill 1996). In short, railway stations pose the classic problem of social order 
in the city. The throughput of travellers makes relationships particularly 
impersonal. Disturbances are dealt with a minimal level of informal regulations, 
and travellers remain onlookers upon problems which do not directly concern 
them. Nowadays, railway stations are open public spaces with shops, and as a 
result they attract the marginalized. Homeless people, beggars and vagrants pose a 
dual problem for railway companies. On the one hand, the sight of poverty is bad 
for business. Railway stations can be frightening and discourage people from 
travelling by train. The profitability of shops in railway stations is reduced when 
travellers do not feel at ease. Marginalized people who beg in a rather aggressive 
way give rise to complaints. On the other hand, the majority of travellers feel 
compassion for people reduced to begging, and they will not stand for poor people 
being ill-treated in front of them. Railway stations are public spaces, which 
prevents the railway companies from controlling access to them and from carrying 
out purely repressive policies against the marginalized.  
 
In this article, I analyze the way in which two railway companies, in 
Lyon and Milan, have tackled the problem of marginalized people in their 
stations. How did the French company (SNCF) rehouse a group of homeless 
people between 1998 and 1999, and how did the town council and the Italian 
company (FS2) come to favour the work of social workers over that of the police 
between 1993 and 2004? 
                                                     
1
 Translated from French by Gilla Evans. Thanks to Hugo Bertillot, Ayda Hadizadeh, Marie-Pierre 
Hamel, Patrick Le Galès, Naïma Makri, Olivia Nicol and Julie Pollard, who gave useful feedback 
on earlier drafts. The paper has been presented at the CERSA (CNRS) seminar and the ENS 
Cachan conference “Action publique et mobilisations face aux populations mobiles 
‘indésirables’”. Special thanks to Clément Théry, whose unusual sharpness proved (again) 
immensely useful. 
2
 In Italy, the historical national railway company is Ferrovie dello Stato (FS). FS became a 
holding company which combined two bodies, Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (RFI) and Trenitalia. RFI 
manages the infrastructure (the railway network) and Trenitalia operates the trains. In practical 
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In 1998, in Part-Dieu railway station in Lyon, station users and 
tradesmen complained of the presence of homeless people, their alcoholic 
outbursts and their dirtiness. The SNCF planned to have these marginalized 
people removed by its internal security service, but an executive suggested that 
they call on the services of a charitable organization which he had heard of in the 
press. In collaboration with the Ministry of Health, the municipality, the station’s 
trade organization and the police, the SNCF funded an expert’s report and a 
rehousing initiative. The social workers of the organization contacted produced 
the expert’s report and carried out the initiative. The homeless were rehoused and 
did not return to the railway station.  
 
In the early 1990s three types of marginality were to be found in the 
Stazione Centrale of Milan: the conventional homeless, drug addicts and newly 
arrived immigrants. In 1991, the closure of the station at night drove these 
marginalized people out onto the square and onto the tracks. A number of 
homeless people died of cold and several drug addicts died of an overdose. 
Conflicts broke out between Moroccan and Albanian immigrants. The railway 
station became the very symbol of insecurity. Between 1993 and 1999, the 
problems of criminality and marginality met with an essentially repressive 
response on the part of the police. But the persistent presence of drug addicts and 
homeless people continued to detract from the station’s reputation and damage the 
ambitions of the FS for its commercial renewal. In view of attacks in the press and 
the discontent of citizens’ committees1, a deputy at the municipality decided to 
experiment a new kind of management of the marginality. In partnership with the 
municipality, the FS invited community organizations which carry out social 
programs to bid for funding. The railway station became known locally as “a 
supermarket for assistance”. Colombo and Navarini (1999) counted around a 
hundred voluntary workers in the health and social spheres at the Stazione 
Centrale in 1999. The profusion of organizations in the precincts of the railway 
station risked overall disorganization. To provide a coordinating body, the city 
opened a Help Center with its own office at the station, open to everyone, to 
streamline the offer of accommodation, food and blankets, with a view to making 
things easier for marginalized people faced with a fragmented offer of services. 
The results were convincing: drug addicts were given support, and some of the 
homeless and immigrants were relocated into disused warehouses belonging to the 
FS, out of the sight of station users. 
 
In both cases, the community organizations and their partners 
implemented social policies, both to disperse the marginalized people and to avoid 
their being subjected to repression pure and simple. These strategies were 
designed in consultation with the railway companies, which are confronted with 
                                                                                                                                                 
terms, RFI sells Trenitalia time slots in which the trains can operate. RFI also uses service 
providers to run the stations: Grandi Stazioni operates the thirteen largest Italian stations. 
1
 Citizens’ committees are locally based associations largely comprising men in stable professional 
employment. With the legitimacy conferred on them by their status as a group of respectable 
citizens, they formulate demands to the municipality and institutions, generally on the subject of 
criminality and immigration. Their image is strongly associated with the parties furthest to the 
right of the Italian political spectrum (Lega Nord, Alleanza Nazionale), but research on the ground 
tends to show that the members of these committees are not so much associated with these parties 
as being exploited by them (Della Porta and Andretta 2001, Poletti 2003). 
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the fundamental ambivalence of travellers towards marginalized people, a mixture 
of rejection and compassion. From a theoretical point of view, analyzing the 
policy implemented involves moving away from two hypotheses, the irenic 
hypothesis which regards social policies and security policies as opposing one 
another, and the malefic hypothesis which identifies them with one another (1). In 
railway stations, the limitations of police action and the unintended consequences 
of social policies require the coordination of actors with different values (2). The 
community organizations are funded by the municipalities and railway companies 
to carry out a particular service: the control of marginalized people (3). The 
community organizations are not however mere instruments: they have to take 
care of their legitimacy and they are able to use the security concerns of their 
employers for their own ends (4). The conclusion stresses how an analysis in 
terms of power relations which highlights the agency of the actors (especially of 
the community organizations) enables us to go beyond the opposition between the 
irenic and malefic hypotheses (5). 
1. Mechanisms for social order in urban areas 
What is the rationality of the institutions that fund third sector 
organizations to work on dispersing marginalized people in railway stations? The 
literature reveals two types of response. For the first type of response, the 
organizations are welfare providers and the use of charitable organizations occurs 
in the context of privatization of the welfare state. Social policies that would once 
have been carried out by the public authorities are now carried out by private 
organizations. Public authorities, subject to budgetary constraints, fund 
community organizations to carry out social policies more cheaply. This is 
notably the argument of Salamon (1993), O’Looney (1993), Smith and Lipsky 
(1993), Austin (2003) and Marwell (2004), who analyze the rise in power of the 
third or voluntary sector as a means of privatizing the welfare state in the United 
States. Drawing up contracts with community organizations through invitation to 
tender and fixed-term funding, as well as the use of volunteers by the 
organizations, brings down costs and allows social policies to be diversified to 
match the various issues that arise. The debate that follows is essentially 
normative in nature, and implicitly conveys a positive assessment of the social 
policies conducted by the state: Salamon (1993) condemns the “commodification” 
of social aid, while O’Looney (1993) considers that the privatization of social 
services does not in any case stem only from a conservative logic of reducing the 
remit of the welfare state: it is also in keeping with a “leftist” critique of heavy-
handed state bureaucracy, insensitive to individual cases and which stigmatizes 
users. In this “leftist” critique of the welfare state, the growth in the role of 
community organizations in the provision of social services is a solution to these 
problems related to bureaucracy. Austin (2003) cites some sixty academic 
references showing how the mechanism of invitation to tender is effective in 
bringing down costs without reducing the quality of the services, provided that it 
is possible to place community organizations in competition with one another. 
This first type of response therefore presupposes that social policies are 
fundamentally benevolent and preferable to security policies: this is the irenic 
hypothesis.  
 
For the second type of response, the issue is not the privatization of 
social policies, but rather the dressing up of security policies as social policies (cf. 
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Piven and Cloward 1993): this is the malefic hypothesis. This hypothesis is based 
on two presuppositions: (i) social policies should and could in theory be legitimate 
progressive objectives, but are in practice a means of social control; (ii) social 
control is a means for the dominant class to reinforce its domination. From this 
perspective, many writers have suggested that the social policies were not 
conceived with a view to improving the wellbeing of the most destitute, but in 
order to contribute to the maintenance of social order (O’Connor 1973, Platt 1977, 
Donzelot 1977, Cohen 1979, Offe 1984). For Piven and Cloward (1993), the 
ultimate aim of the social policies is to prevent disturbances and riots, and to 
reinforce the work ethic favourable to capitalism (for a critique: Durman 1973, 
Trattner 1983, Van Krieken 1991 and Dodenhoff 1998). Like the debate on the 
privatization of social policies, this issue conceals a high potential for political 
polarization. The discussion risks focusing on the essentialist problem of knowing 
whether such a social policy is (or is not) social control, a discussion which will 
be determined a priori by the way in which either camp constructs what it 
understands by “social policy” and “social control”. To get away from this aporia, 
this article proposes not to look at the question of the essence (social policy versus 
security policy) but rather to look at the subjective meaning these categories have 
for the actors, in order to inquire into the specific mechanisms implemented 
towards marginalized people by the community organizations. 
 
From the point of view of the actors, the opposition between social 
policy and security policy is very meaningful: this opposition has emic relevance. 
From the conservative point of view, security policies are associated with 
efficiency and authority, while social policies are associated with “do-gooders” 
and excessive tolerance; and marginalized people are criminals or nuisances. 
From the progressive point of view, social policies are associated with humanism 
and justice, while security policies are associated with repression and violence; 
and marginalized people are victims. The police tend to value security policies, 
while social workers value social policies. From the point of view of sociology, 
from an etic point of view, the dichotomous opposition between social policy and 
security policy in practice has to be challenged. Taking account of what is 
meaningful for the actors enables us to reconstruct their rationalities; not using 
these oppositions as categories of analysis enables us to describe the mechanisms 
for managing marginalized people and the interactions between the organizations 
and their employers. By getting away from the essentialist opposition between 
security policy and social policy, we give ourselves the means to take account of 
the power relationships, the agency1 of the actors, their local margin of 
manoeuvre, and their capacity to exploit their interactants. Such a strategy should 
make it possible to avoid both the irenic vision (in which “human” and “just” 
social policies come to the aid of marginalized people) and the malefic vision (in 
which social policies are nothing more than security policies in disguise). 
 
                                                     
1
 The notion of agency is used in two registers: the theoretical question of the relationship between 
association and agency (Sewell 1992, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Emirbayer and Mische 
1998), and the theory of the principal-agent (also known as agency theory) (Shapiro 2005). In this 
paper, the notion of agency refers to the idea that most of the time the actors refuse to be a simple 
means at the service of exogenous ends, and that they retain, even in asymmetrical relationships, a 
margin for manoeuvre which they know how to make use of (Crozier and Friedberg 1977, 
Friedberg 1993) because they are fundamentally endowed with “self-interest (with guile)” 
(Williamson 1975). 
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Methodology: a study in two stations 
 
The empirical work that underpins this analysis is based on two monographs carried out 
in the Part-Dieu station in Lyon and the Stazione Centrale in Milan between 2002 and 
2004. It goes without saying that two cases cannot possibly enable to draw general 
conclusions about third sector organizations or about the larger issues tackled in this 
work. The function of the cases presented here is to show in practical terms what the 
questions posed refer to, and to identify the empirical mechanisms, for which it is safe to 
assume that there is no reason why they would not occur in other contexts. The 
qualitative survey essentially consisted of making observations and conducting 
interviews, mainly with the railway companies, the police and social workers, on each 
site (30 interviews in the Lyon station, 18 in the Milan station). Collecting all these points 
of view enables us to produce a synthesis that is different from the sum of the individual 
points of view of each actor. The survey should therefore lead to “a simplification of 
reality, partially at odds with the ordinary interpretations and visions of the actors in the 
context of the action studied” (Friedberg 1993: 317). The logic of the comparison 
between France and Italy is not to control cultural or institutional variables, but rather to 
move away from the framework of the nation state in order to identify mechanisms that 
are not specific to a particular country. It is important to point out that the data from the 
Italian case and the French case are not of the same nature. Some 80,000 people pass 
through the railway station in Lyon every day, and the facts investigated relate to some 
ten homeless people, over a period of two years. 300,000 people pass through the Milan 
railway station every day; and the events take place between 1993 and 2004, and they 
relate to a significant and diverse marginalized population (drug addicts, homeless people 
and immigrants). This is why the Italian case will receive more attention in the 
developments to follow. 
 
 
2. Managing unintended consequences 
Since 1991, a Directive of the European Commission has encouraged 
member states to embark on a process of opening the railway sector up to 
competition. This opening up involves on the one hand an end to national 
monopolies over railways, and on the other privatization of national companies. 
Public railway companies tend to be loss-making and highly dependent on 
subsidies (Marlot 2004, Guélaud 2002). Traditionally, these companies invested 
more in the trains, which are the core of their business, than in the stations, which 
were for a long time viewed as functional spaces in which to assemble passengers 
at points of convergence before getting them onto the trains (Sander 1996). This 
lower investment in railway stations had contributed to their dereliction. The poor 
reputation of railway stations and the people regarded as undesirables that they 
attract became a particular problem for the railway companies when it came to 
opening them up to competition. The SNCF set up a stations department, and the 
FS set up the Grandi Stazioni project in order to carry out renovation projects for 
their railway stations. The idea was to introduce mini shopping centres in order to 
take advantage of the potential customers passing through the stations every day. 
These shops, in their turn, need security, which the railway companies, to whom 
they pay rent, had to provide. In the medium term, the railway companies rely on 
the presence of shops to contribute to the redefinition of the railway station. From 
this viewpoint, the presence of marginalized people is doubly detrimental to the 
railway companies’ profitability: the homeless indirectly convey a negative image 
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of the world of the train, and by reducing their attractiveness to businesses (the 
rent the shopkeepers pay), they directly affect the profitability of these companies. 
In order to get rid of marginalized people, the companies initially contemplated 
resorting to coercion.  
The limitations of police work 
In the French case, the SNCF thought first of using its internal security 
service, Surveillance Générale (Suge). Its work would have consisted of harassing 
the homeless in such a way that would deter them from hanging around in the 
precincts of the station. This solution came up against legal constraints and image 
problems. On the one hand, sitting down in a railway station is not legally 
prohibited, and the police or officials of the Suge can only punish criminal 
offences, such as forcing children to beg. On the other hand, a railway station is a 
public space, subject to the gaze of travellers, who might protest against any 
violent intervention. It is not in the railway company’s interest to have a crowd 
form and disrupt the flow of people. An SNCF executive therefore convinced his 
management to find a non-coercive solution and call upon social workers. 
 
In the Italian case, the police was the sole security actor from 1993 to 
1999. In 1992, the Lega Nord (Northern League) won the municipal elections, and 
brought pressure to bear on finding a policing solution for the railway station. In 
1993, corrupt policemen were removed from the station. “Major operations” then 
began: police raids at night, using police vans, to arrest a maximum number of 
marginalized people, deport immigrants and imprison drug dealers.   
(And what was that like?) Heavy patrols. We had these 
non-EU nationals1, so with around thirty policemen, we arrested 
all the non-EU nationals, marginalized people and undesirables, 
we put them in a police van, and they were all taken to the 
police station, where they were charged with an offence. (Police 
Superintendent, Italian station) 
The criminal networks were weakened and drug trafficking was pushed 
back into the adjacent streets, but the experience of users, travellers and local 
residents, did not change: the railway stations still attracted many marginalized 
people. This is where police action finds its limitations: the police can arrest 
offenders, but they have neither the means nor is it their mission to deal with 
poverty, which has no legal definition. The police simply cannot do the social 
work that is required to take care of marginalized people. 
Even an idiot can understand that someone who sleeps 
in a shelter at night will not be dossing in the street with a 
blanket and a bottle of beer, that someone who has been given a 
meal will not go off and steal food, that someone who has been 
given shoes will not walk around barefoot, and that someone 
who has been given a clean t-shirt, creates less of a disturbance 
than if he’s wearing a t-shirt covered in blood. (…) These are 
ordinary examples. Helping people to get access to a health 
                                                     
1
 The Italian word to designate (poor) immigrants is “extracomunitari”, literally “non-EU 
national”, which can refer to white European (such as Ukrainians), Asian, South American or 
African immigrants. 
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system, helping them in their dealings with the authorities, 
avoids other problems. You protect the fringes at risk. Educating 
prostitutes about cleanliness, washing, avoids them passing on 
diseases. (Social worker 2, Italian station) 
In Milan as in Lyon, it is not so much benevolence towards the most 
vulnerable people as the limitations (perceived and real) of the police solution that 
motivated the municipality and the railway companies to turn to social policies. 
The unintended consequences of social policies 
Turning to social policies to produce order has many advantages in 
practical and symbolic terms. This strategy nevertheless raises the problem of its 
own unintended consequences. The issue here is not to judge the appropriateness 
of the idea of the unintended consequence of assistance or its intrinsically 
reactionary nature (Somers and Block 2005), but to look at it from the point of 
view of the promoters of “social” solutions, particularly within the railway 
companies. From the point of view of the actors who wish to reduce the nuisance 
caused by marginalized people, an unintended consequence is an incentivising 
structure set up to disperse marginalized people which ends up attracting more 
than it disperses. 
 
The promoters of non-repressive solutions at the SNCF, assumed to be 
the most concerned both about the interests of the homeless and about the most 
humane possible treatment of poverty, are acutely aware of the problem of 
assistance. The experience of the major Parisian railway stations shows that the 
distribution of food (from soup kitchens) attracts large numbers of the needy. 
There are unintended consequences in the actions you 
take. When you begin to welcome people… At the soup kitchen 
in *** station, there were 100 of them to begin with, and in the 
end it was serving 700 meals a day. It brings people in and then 
they stay. (…) Bringing in people to organize meals in the 
station is counterproductive. (National manager of Mission 
Solidarité, SNCF, French station) 
Food distribution was then rejected, the community 
organizations were in agreement with this, it was rejected 
because it creates support centres. (Regional manager of 
Mission Solidarité, SNCF, French station) 
The actors of the railway company in the Milanese case were also well 
aware of the limitations of the strategy which consists of funding community 
organizations. 
Social aid alone is not enough, it’s like feeding stray 
dogs and cats, it doesn’t solve the problem. You can’t get rid of 
them, so you move them, but it’s not simply a question of moving 
them, you have to organize them (Security manager, Grandi 
Stazioni, Italian station) 
For the organizational actors or those ideologically close to them (whose 
practical interests and values are to promote “social” solutions), the issue of 
unintended consequences is neither a matter of making the poor aware of their 
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responsibilities, nor is it a way of putting the problems of the railway company 
above the wellbeing of marginalized people: it is a matter of the ethics of 
responsibility. If a mechanism for social aid is overloaded, it is stopped, and no 
one benefits from it. It is better for the mechanism to benefit a few rather than to 
benefit no one. To minimize these unintended consequences, the railway 
companies count on the police or on their security service. Implementing 
operations with community organizations implies not creating a precedent which 
makes the homeless of the region think that hanging around in the station is the 
best way to find long-term institutional aid. In other words, it is about helping the 
homeless, in order to make them leave, without attracting others: “to get them out 
of poverty (and out of the station, too)” (Soutrenon 2001). 
 
Consequently, the issue is one of coordination between railway 
companies, police and community organizations. All the actors have different 
values, objectives and methods. The values of the police and social workers are 
often conflicting, some valuing “repressive” policies and others “social” policies. 
But awareness of the intrinsic limitations of the former and the unintended 
consequences of the latter leads these actors to work together. For example, the 
Fratelli di San Francesco (an organization which manages the Help Center) need 
the police when a marginalized person becomes threatening, but the police often 
need the Fratelli to take care of a minor in their communities when the law 
prohibits any criminal action. This situation of interdependency leads the police to 
tolerate certain illegal practices of the Fratelli, such as helping people who are in 
the country illegally. 
The cops know that the Fratelli feed and house 
undocumented immigrants, but they don’t carry out a raid to 
increase arrests, because they are the first to ask the Fratelli to 
take care of mass poverty when they need it, such as when there 
is a humanitarian disaster. So, it’s an informal agreement: “we 
take your needy when necessary, and you don’t come here 
hassling us”. (Social worker 3, Italian station) 
Coordination is carried out by the railway companies. They fund the 
community organizations so that they can carry out services that suit the interests 
of the railway companies. In the next section we are going to look in detail at the 
missions that these organizations are asked to carry out by the railway companies. 
3. Managing the marginalized 
The Lyon station: breaking up the focal point, rehousing the homeless 
In the Lyon station, the SNCF’s objective was to rid the railway station 
of the presence of homeless people. Rather than entrusting this mission to security 
officers or bringing in the police, the SNCF set up a “monitoring committee” with 
the Ministry of Health, the Municipality and the police and decided to call upon 
the services of a charitable organization to resolve the problem.  
 
Initially, this involved carrying out a sociological expert appraisal – the 
speciality of the organization – taking two to three months. This expert appraisal 
was conducted by social workers and was also designed to establish contact with 
the homeless. From April to June 1999, social workers went out to meet the 
  
 
 
10
homeless to gather information about them, establish contacts and create a 
relationship of trust. The social workers observed that the majority of the 
homeless – around a dozen – came and went, never staying in the station for long. 
They sometimes stayed for no longer than an hour. The nuisance they caused 
depended on their level of alcoholism and on the ups and downs of their 
relationships. The social workers realized that the homeless were organized 
around one of them, a man of around fifty who had spent 19 years in the station 
and who “lived” in the car park. Making the most of his perfect knowledge of the 
station and the cordial relations he had managed to establish with the police, 
tradesmen and SNCF employees, he had occupied two parking spaces with his 
belongings for so long that no one even thought of making him leave. He offered 
to let homeless people who came to the railway station stay for a while in “his” 
space for a small sum, promising them relative peace and quiet.  
The conclusion we came to was that we had to break 
the hard core. I really don’t like talking like that but it was 
necessary to break the hard core, the hard core consisted of two 
people, who were living in the car park under the hotel, (…) 
that’s where the homeless bloke lived, so he controlled, he 
controlled, and he even sold spaces to people, “come and sit by 
me, don’t worry, I know the cops, just give me a euro, two 
euros,” well, at the time it was ten francs, and anyway .... we 
said “we have to break this thing”. Well by break I mean make 
the guy who was living there permanently agree to having 
treatment. And the guy agreed to go away for treatment for 
alcoholism. (Regional manager of Mission Solidarité, SNCF, 
French station) 
Secondly, the social workers had to put forward solutions for rehousing 
the homeless, in order to get them to leave the railway station for good. The social 
workers were faced with an obligation to achieve results from their partners in the 
local authority, the police and the SNCF. If they did not manage to rehouse the 
homeless, if they did not manage to establish a relationship of trust with the 
homeless such that they would agree to leave the station, the police and the Suge 
would resort to coercion to “break up the focal point” – the expression used by the 
institutional actors to refer to the removal of the homeless. 
 
Convincing the homeless to leave the station is more complex than it 
might appear, because they develop routines and social interactions in the 
premises that they frequent, and they refuse in any case to be housed in a hostel, 
where the living conditions are very restrictive and where dogs are not allowed. 
Rehousing in a flat allows dogs to be taken into consideration, but involves skills 
which the homeless who are most accustomed to living in the street have lost, 
such as keeping it clean, dealing with leaks, handling gas points with care, using 
the toilet. The social workers finally decided to ensure the departure of the most 
longstanding homeless person in the station, the one who rented his space to 
others, in order to prevent others moving in afterwards. They convinced the old 
man to go for treatment for alcoholism and helped him move into a small 
apartment. The SNCF immediately installed wire netting around the place the 
homeless had been using and the station’s security officers carried out a 
systematic policy of discouraging new arrivals. The other homeless people agreed 
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to be rehoused. In the winter of 1999-2000 new homeless people arrived in the 
station, but did not stay. 
The Milanese station: moving marginalized people away in the long-
term 
In the Milan station, it was less a case of rehousing a few homeless 
people (as in the French station) than of controlling the nuisance caused by the 
presence of hundreds of marginalized people. There are many community 
organizations each playing a role in managing the poverty the railway station 
attracts. The community organizations, by offering services to marginalized 
people, create a relationship of dependence and personalization of relations which 
cannot fail to stabilize these populations which potentially put order in the station 
at risk. The function of control played by the community organizations is the 
keystone of the security policy of the FS group, which has managed to take 
advantage of the funding granted by the Municipality, according to two methods: 
the dispersal of marginalized people and the accumulation of information about 
them. 
 
Because the station continued, in spite of police repression, to draw 
marginalized people who frightened travellers, the various constituents of the 
Italian railway company coordinated with each other to use the station’s Help 
Center as a centre for dispersing marginalized people throughout the area. The 
reasoning was as follows: since the poor are going to come to the station in any 
case, and since in any case it is not possible to make them leave without offering 
them an alternative, you might as well accept the inevitable presence of 
marginalized people in order to better channel them towards the areas where they 
cause less nuisance. This solution requires having free spaces available which are 
able to take the marginalized people. The Help Center only carried out its function 
of dispersal on condition that it could offer the marginalized people spaces in 
refuges. For a person in need, the decision to leave the support networks and 
solutions offered by the railway station can only be motivated by a prospect that is 
at least comparable, i.e. another form of aid. Now, like all the national railway 
companies, the FS group is historically a large property owner. And, like 
everywhere in Europe, rail transport has declined considerably since the Second 
World War. RFI (the infrastructure and network branch of FS) owns a number of 
more or less abandoned signal boxes, small stations, warehouses and sheds. The 
smallest stations are increasingly operated unmanned. In Lombardy, 45 % of 
stations are fully automated. These railway infrastructures are often occupied 
illegally by groups of immigrants. Police operations against this phenomenon 
have no long-term effect as the squatters always come back. When a facility has 
been squatted and the police have intervened, it costs the RFI on average € 
250,000 to restore the property to its initial value. For RFI, these spaces might 
therefore be better used, hence the idea of having them run by community 
organizations in order to protect them against illegal occupation. In Lombardy 80 
railway stations are now run in this way. Out of the 1500 automated stations (but 
which also have travellers passing through) in Italy, 400 are run by community 
organizations. The organizations do well out of this, since they are given premises 
free of charge and are legitimized in their action; and the railway company also 
does well out of the arrangement, since the marginalized people are settled and 
kept under control, out of sight of travellers.  
  
 
 
12
 
But the ambition of the authorities does not boil down simply to the 
dispersal of the marginalized. Grandi Stazioni’s plan is to make the most of the 
grassroots knowledge of the organizations in order to gain a better understanding 
of these marginalized populations, isolating those who are potentially dangerous 
and where applicable carrying out targeted repressive campaigns.   
It is therefore a synergy. The community organizations 
that are working in the station, who come to the aid of the 
homeless, have signed an agreement with us to improve security. 
They make their knowledge of the people they mix with available 
to us, distinguishing criminals, dealers and violent people from 
the homeless. With the community organizations, we can 
pinpoint dangerous individuals, in order to cure the station once 
more (…) There is an agreement between the community 
organizations, the city, the station and the police to improve 
security. Standardized forms have been produced to improve our 
knowledge of the homeless and the marginalized and put those 
who behave badly into prison. It all revolves around these 
forms. And as Grandi Stazioni is giving these community 
organizations premises … (Security manager, Grandi Stazioni, 
Italian station) 
The railway company, which provides the community organizations with 
premises and funding, expects its community organization interlocutors to give it 
in exchange individualized information on the marginalized people with which 
they are in daily contact. The work of the railway company is therefore to 
integrate the work of the community organizations into the station’s security 
policy by building up the coordination between the community organizations and 
the police, so that police repression and social work are no longer seen as being in 
opposition, and to make the most of the skills of both to further the conversion of 
the station into an attractive area for its customers1. 
 
The work of the community organizations stresses the complexity of 
managing marginalized people in railway stations. Bearing in mind the legal 
constraints and the intrinsic attractiveness of stations to marginalized people, a 
policy based purely on policing is not effective. To achieve its ends, the railway 
company is forced to practise, through community organizations, a subtle game of 
incentives and sanctions. From a more strictly analytical viewpoint, it is possible 
to identify two social control mechanisms at work in these social policies: (a) the 
use of incentive and disincentive measures which affect or channel behaviour, and 
(b) the establishing of relationships of dependence which keep a check on the 
beneficiary of these social policies. In both stations, the charitable organizations 
are using incentives to get marginalized people to leave the station. In the Milan 
station, the ongoing support provided for marginalized people makes them more 
predictable as they are more dependent on the aid.  
                                                     
1
 At the time of the research, this project had not yet been implemented. It is clear that for 
ideological and religious reasons, community associations are reluctant to provide this 
information, particularly to the police (Navarini et al. undated). The question is twofold: can the 
railway company force the community associations to cooperate? What area of doubt are the 
community associations in a position to maintain? 
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The active cooperation of the community organizations in the dispersal 
of marginalized people shows to what extent the boundary between social policy 
and security policy is empirically tenuous: a dichotomous conception of these two 
concepts is inappropriate. This cooperation also creates a tension between the 
objectives of the community organizations (“tackling social issues”) and those of 
the railway companies (“getting rid of marginalized people”). Does this mean that 
the community organizations are instruments of social control? In the next part we 
are going to try to show the opposite by highlighting the notion of agency. 
4. Managing legitimacy and the interplay of exploitations 
The specific legitimacy of community organizations is based on their 
capacity to present themselves as actors disinterested in material profit (Gadrey 
2000) and motivated by solidarity and compassion rather than opportunism. 
People imagine the world of community organizations to be swimming with 
charismatic figures and positive values such as solidarity and self-sacrifice. A 
significant part of social science literature on the third sector and civil society also 
uses this discourse of praise. Within it the non-profit sector is described as a major 
social innovation (Salamon 1995, Salamon and Anheier 1997, Anheier and 
Salamon 1998, Salamon et al. 1999), regarded as remedying the problems 
deriving from capitalism (Fourel 2001, Jeantet 2006, Laville and Cattani 2006, 
Laville et. al 1997, Laville 2000) and renewing democracy (Putnam 2000, Chanial 
2001, Evers 2000)1. This specific legitimacy is the principle that motivates 
volunteers to work for community organizations, which are able to operate thanks 
to the normative commitment of their members (Etzioni 1964).  
 
This same legitimacy is indispensable in the relationship of community 
organizations with their institutional partners. The Municipality and the railway 
company are all the more inclined to fund community organizations if these 
organizations are able to bring their legitimacy to bear in such a way that this 
legitimacy reflects on those providing the funding. Funding a charitable 
organization shows that one is concerned about human issues and not only about 
financial profit. Community organizations are well aware that they are selling 
their legitimacy as much as their labour force. They are all the more aware of it 
because, as organizations, they are faced with the problem of keeping going or 
even of survival. Because community organizations are organizations, their first 
imperative, like all organizations, is to survive (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 
Carroll 1984, Hall 2002). In order to keep going, organizations must cooperate 
with actors who have the means for their survival. Marwell (2004) has shown for 
example how community organizations providing home help services in two 
Hispanic neighbourhoods of New York were directly involved in local electoral 
clientelism. The community organizations receive subsidies from local 
councillors. The local councillors want to be re-elected. The community 
                                                     
1
 Empirical work on community associations is distinctly less lyrical. It stresses the conflicts and 
the power relations within community associations (Laville and Sainsaulieu 1997a), and the ups 
and downs of their daily operation, of their professionalization and the nature of their funding 
(Haeringer et al. 1997, Laville and Sainsaulieu 1997b). Besides, Salamon (1995), concerned at 
seeing rather too optimistic a literature developing about the capacity of community associations 
to “change people’s lives”, warned over ten years ago against the romanticization of the third 
sector in literature. See also the critical discussions of Mayer (2003) and Pirotte (2007). 
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organizations want to go on helping people. So it is in the interest of local 
councillors to subsidise the community organizations that are favourable to them, 
at the expense of those that are not, and to use the influence that they have in the 
population to help them be re-elected. The community organizations have an 
interest in stabilizing their funding and therefore in getting the politicians who 
grant them subsidies elected. In a context in which each community organization 
depends on funding that is always temporary, the survival of the organization 
depends on its capacity to be able to continue to sell its services. As a result the 
relations between community organizations and those funding them involve 
mutual exploitation, the sophistication of which is at odds with the 
disinterestedness on which their legitimacy is based. 
 
Almost all volunteers, social workers and community organization 
managers who work on behalf of the homeless and drug addicts are firmly 
convinced that the destitute people at the station are worthy of respect and 
consideration. The main community organizations are part of the Christian-social 
movement and almost all of the social workers are firmly progressive. They 
consider marginalized people to be victims of an unfair economic order and of an 
egotistical society. Working in a charitable organization almost always implies 
favouring social aid over repression in the treatment of poverty. From that, one 
might expect community organizations to show hostility towards the intentions of 
the Municipality or Grandi Stazioni: for do these bodies not view solidarity as a 
means in the service of security? 
 
On the contrary, the security intentions of the Municipality and Grandi 
Stazioni are resources for the community organizations in the railway station. 
Rather than holding on tightly to a purely charitable process, they intend to benefit 
from the opportunities – material and symbolic – that the present situation offers, 
by explicitly linking social aid and improvement in security in their applications 
for funding or premises. The theme of security as a principle justifying the 
collective usefulness of social work is used by community organizations as a code 
of communication with the various components of the railway company. 
Our community organizations are involved in aid projects on 
behalf of the fringes of profound marginality which are often 
represented in the form of social concerns and danger to citizens, and 
this without doubt links the consideration with the security aspect. 
(…) Our community organizations have effectively shown in recent 
years that the action of aid, help and social protection of the fringe 
groups at greatest risk, accompanied by the equally necessary action 
of prevention, security and control by the forces of order, are the best 
conditions through which one can effectively deal with the problems 
related to profound social marginality, even on the fringes most at 
risk, with an undoubted benefit to citizens.1  
The managers of community organizations are obviously convinced of 
the collective usefulness of their work but tend to view the question of security as 
secondary within an overall issue in which the priority is to come to the aid of 
poor people whose lives are in danger. Justifying the usefulness of their work 
                                                     
1
 Undated document from a group of community associations working at the station, entitled 
“Solidareta e sicurezza”. 
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from the security point of view therefore falls within the perspective of a cynical 
and opportunistic use of the situation to their own advantage. 
In a meeting with the Lega Nord, when they ask us 
what we would do if we found a kid who had run away from 
Sicily and who turned up [at the station], we don’t say “We did 
a great thing, we returned a kid to his parents,” we say “we 
removed a criminal danger from the streets of Milan” 
(laughter). (Social worker 2, Italian station) 
The community organizations that sell their legitimacy in order to 
collaborate with security policies are not mere victims: they have a capacity for 
agency. They benefit from their usefulness to the municipality or the railway 
company in order to get funding and they intend to use their margin for 
manoeuvre at local level to maximize the social dimension of their mission to the 
detriment of the security dimension. But they are playing with actors who are no 
less pragmatic; in the game of mutual exploitation, they can also come out the 
losers. The experience of other partnerships are the proof of this: charitable 
organizations are regularly brought in by the public authorities to take part in joint 
operations with the forces of law and order (state or municipal) in the course of 
which the presence of these community organizations appears to be to act as a 
“social guarantee”, the “humanist” justification for a project which is not 
humanist in nature. 
On Place des Terreaux, we were exploited much 
more… We played the role of social guarantee for cleaning up 
the Place des Terreaux. We were really manipulated… (Social 
worker, French station) 
In the case mentioned by this interviewee, the social workers were not 
informed about police operations carried out against the marginalized people 
whose trust they were supposed to have gained. This shows that the exploitation 
works two ways: on the one hand the community organizations exploit the theme 
of security and the bad conscience of certain decision-makers in order to keep 
their sources of funding going with projects at the margins of social work; on the 
other hand, the public authorities and private companies exploit the community 
organizations by making them play the role of “social guarantee” when problems 
are controversial. As there are many community organizations and their funding is 
insecure, it is plausible that they are being exploited more often than they exploit 
more stable actors such as the public authorities or large companies. 
5. Conclusion 
Faced with the problem of marginalized people in railway stations, the 
railway companies have turned to charitable organizations to find a more 
satisfactory solution than mere repression. The notion of management (of 
unintended consequences, of marginalized people and legitimacy) enables them to 
exploit the subtle power relations that come into play in the implementation of 
these policies. In Lyon as in Milan, the community organizations have to manage 
the unintended consequences of their own work, both to satisfy the demands of 
their employer, but also so that they can continue to offer attractive services. They 
set up incentive structures for marginalized people in order to make them comply 
with the expectations defined by the railway companies. These incentive 
  
 
 
16
structures are not by nature coercive, and for this reason the community 
organizations cooperate with the police. They set up a game in which there is 
something for everyone, marginalized people and railway companies. But the 
community organizations are managing not only marginalized people, they are 
also managing their legitimacy. In short, they participate in the philanthropic, 
“social” (as opposed to “security”) legitimation of the railway companies, at the 
risk of putting their own legitimacy in danger by participating in the commercial 
upgrading of stations.   
 
A pragmatic strategy for the railway companies therefore implies 
reconciling police operations with social treatment in a bid to limit conflicts and 
make the space as pleasant as possible for users – but this requires compromises 
to be made with a fundamentalist conception of “security”. Symmetrically, 
speaking of “solidarity” in reference to social work seems improper given the 
exploitation of this solidarity: dispersing marginalized people, making the station 
better for business, satisfying the demands of voters. The community 
organizations are not taken in by this policy but they do benefit from the 
opportunities it provides to ensure the survival of their organization. For the 
management of community organizations and for the volunteers, the desirable 
objective would be the disappearance of poverty as an insult to humanity; for 
Grandi Stazioni and the SNCF, it is a more modest matter of reducing the 
visibility of poverty in the spaces around the railway station in order to minimize 
damage to business. But all the managers of the various components of the FS 
Group and the SNCF know that there will always be marginalized people and that 
the railway stations will always attract them.  
 
In this game the central backers are the railway companies, and the 
central service providers are the community organizations. The state remains a 
notable actor due to the involvement of the police, but it is practically absent from 
the social policies. In France, its share of the funding of community organizations 
through its local public services, in a project that it has not initiated and does not 
run, is minor; in Italy, it is only marginally involved in the way the operation is 
funded.  
 
The approach taken allows two deceptive conceptions of the relation 
between social policies and security policies to be kept apart. On the one hand, 
fieldwork shows that the management of marginalized people by community 
organizations falls within a continuum between social policy and criminal policy, 
in the middle of which the boundaries are vague. The dichotomous opposition 
between social policy and security policy makes no sense; the irenic hypothesis, 
which idealizes (“humane” and “just”) social policies by opposing them to 
(“repressive” and “violent”) security policies, ignores this complexity. On the 
other hand, within this continuum, the community organizations are trying to use 
their agency at local level to ensure the “social” nature of their mission, which is 
to participate in the upgrading of the station. This capacity for agency contradicts 
the malefic hypotheses according to which social policies “only” carry out a more 
insidious form of social control.  
 
There remains a paradox. To get beyond the opposition between the 
irenic hypothesis and the malefic hypothesis, it is necessary to differentiate 
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between emic concepts (those of the actors) and etic concepts (those of 
sociological analysis). As it happens, it is vital to understand the meaning and 
value that the “social policy” and “security policy” categories have for the actors 
concerned, if you want to analyze the policies implemented in the railway stations 
of Lyon and Milan. But claiming the superiority of science over common sense 
does not do the actors justice: the strategies used by the actors testify to a 
perfectly practical analysis of the real challenges (not to mention the academic 
translation of the irenic and malefic hypotheses). All in all, this article shows to 
what extent the actors involved are pragmatic, competent and insightful, and 
capable of understanding the nature of power relations from a practical point of 
view.   
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